Noteworthy : Fed lending and moral hazard by Jeff Lacker
A
s many of you know
— and as was an-
nounced in the last
issue of this magazine — Al
Broaddus has retired as pres-
ident of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond, after more
than 34 years of outstanding
service to the Bank and the
Federal Reserve System. I am
honored and humbled to have
been chosen to succeed him.
His contributions have been
enormous — and his leader-
ship exemplary. 
For the past seven years,
Al’s column has graced the
opening pages of Region
Focus. In this, as in so many
other ways, I hope to live up
to  the high standards that
Al has set. There are some
very important challenges
facing the Fed — including,
of course, our ongoing
efforts to maintain price
stability — that I would like
to  address in this space.
From time to time, I also
would like to discuss some
broader economic and pub-
lic-policy issues that may
seem to touch only periph-
erally on the Fed’s core
functions, but which never-
theless are vitally impor-
tant. One such topic that
comes to mind is the role
that technological growth is
having on wage inequality.
But for my initial
“Noteworthy” column, I
would like to stay fairly
close to home and discuss a
topic that occupies the time
and minds of many people
throughout this Bank and
the Federal Reserve System:
how to provide financial
institutions with sufficient
liquidity without encourag-
ing them to engage in
unsound business practices. 
By lending through the
discount window, the Fed
can help stave off financial
crises. For instance, in the
days immediately following
the terrorist attacks of Sept.
11, 2001, the Federal Reserve
System loaned about $46 
billion from the discount
window. This was crucial in
helping the nation’s financial 
system cope with the disrup-
tions caused by the attacks.
In  our financial system, the
discount window has a use-
ful  role to play — and not
just in situations as severe
and tragic as 9/11. 
But we also need to be
wary of the risks that exces-
sive lending can bring. Fed
lending to a troubled bank
can allow uninsured deposi-
tors and creditors to with-
draw funds just before the
bank fails. This weakens
their incentive to monitor a
bank’s risk-taking and can
increase the cost of the
bank’s failure to the deposit
insurance fund. And by
weakening this market 
discipline, we increase the
chances that a bank will
become insolvent. 
Given the substantial
financial safety net — and
the risks it poses to tax-
payers — the Fed must be
vigilant in both its lending
practices and its supervision
of financial institutions.
What does this mean in
practice? In the past, the
Fed typically has lent money
to any bank with acceptable
collateral, including many
troubled banks that soon
failed. The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Im-
provement Act of 1991 —
better known as FDICIA—
placed limits on the Fed’s
ability to lend to undercapi-
talized banks, but left the
Fed with considerable dis-
cretion in extending credit
to  banks facing potentially
critical financial problems.
This presents us with a
dilemma: Should the Fed 
try to help those at-risk
banks or instead withhold
funds to limit moral-hazard
problems? It’s not an easy
question to answer, but I’m
inclined to say that the Fed
should avoid lending to
unsound banks, even those
on the verge of collapse. It
would be tempting for the
Fed to intervene in such situ-
ations but, in my view, it
would in many cases be
unwise.
None of this is to say that
sound, stable banks should
be denied funds. In our
banking system, discount
window lending is important
and useful. The Fed should
continue to use this tool to
help fundamentally healthy
banks meet short-term liq-
uidity needs — but it should
do so judiciously and proba-
bly more sparingly. 
As President of this insti-
tution, the risks associated
with discount window lend-
ing is an issue that will
occupy my attention much
over the coming months and
years. As my thoughts evolve
— and as events dictate — I
will have more to say on the
topic. But for now I will close
by reiterating what a pleas-
ure it is to lead theRichmond
Fed and its tremendous staff.
It’s  a great challenge that I
look forward to with great
excitement.
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